Found: Identity Provider Business Case, or not?

I had the pleasure to have been part of the Identity community in the “early days”. Right before OpenID came into existence and most people thought of Microsoft Passport as innovative. One very hot topic was the idea of an “Identity Provider”. An Identity Provider is a party on the Internet who would be happy to serve any claims about me to a any relying party, obviously with the user’s consent and control. Anyone remember the expression “user centric identity”?

There were some unsolved issues:

  • How would an Identity Provider make money to pay for the operational costs?
  • How would relying parties know which Identity Provider to trust?

Especially the second issue was hard. Some relying parties just want to be able to recognize recurring visitors and are happy with a couple of standard attributes. For them, identity has low value. Well known examples are the myriad of forum sites.

Other relying parties however want more, they want identities with verified attributes, an identity they can trust. For them, identities have value and untrusted identities come with a business risk. An extreme example would be a financial institution who would, for these reasons, typically never outsources the Identity Provider role.

A couple of days I came across an interesting article about Facebook offering their commenting system to other sites, including authentication through Facebook. What caught my eye was an argument showing that Facebook serves as an almost perfect Identity Provider in some sense:

This offers publishers a number of benefits. They get more links to their site from inside the net’s most popular website. A lot of people are “registered” to comment on their sites. And, they have a system designed to discourage vitriol because it’s easy for the site owner to ban a user and tough for a user to create a new identity.

Especially that last part is interesting: relying parties can put some trust in the provided identities simply because … people invest time and effort in their Facebook identity and generally would not throw this away just to post rubbish on some forum. In other words, relying parties will like Facebook identities. They trust one Identity Provider, Facebook, and they get hundreds of millions of fairly trustful Identities.

But what is in it for Facebook? A lot!

For Facebook, the benefit is also clear. Users now have even more incentive to be constantly logged into Facebook (those who are already logged into Facebook don’t have to do anything to comment on a website using its system). Additionally, even more of Facebook’s users’ net activities flow through its site, since by default comments — and replies to them — post to a Facebook user’s wall. That deepens users’ ties to Facebook, adds more content to Facebook, and gives people more reason to check their Facebook newsfeed for the increased information flow.

By allowing relying parties to use Facebook identities to realize a comment system on their site, Facebook actually generates value for themselves. A win-win it seems.

Facebook, with their Facebook Connect, wants to be the primary Identity Provider on the Internet:

It also builds on what’s becoming Facebook’s most important function: being the identity provider and validator for the wider net. The system opens the door for what’s likely inevitable: having news sites rely on Facebook to identify its users and eventually to serve ads to its readers based on their individual Facebook pages.

Both issues are gone: the Identity Provider (Facebook in this case) can have a very viable business model and the relying party has an Identity Provider they can trust, one that brings hundreds of millions of identities.

So, all well now in the world of Identity? I don’t think so. The relationship between Facebook and relying parties is not a balanced one. Relying parties are clearly at the mercy of Facebook:

… just as Facebook jealously holds onto the e-mail addresses of the people you are connected to on Facebook so you can’t re-establish your network on some other site.

Promising as it may seem, this type of unbalanced relationship should not satisfy us. So, for those still active in the field of Internet Identity, what do you think about this?

OpenID to avoid Phriend Phishing on Twitter?

Johannes Ernst suggests that using OpenID might be a good way to avoid phriend phishing on Twitter:

Should have guessed that Phriend Phishing was first going to happen to somebody famous.

Now, how could that have been prevented?

What if:

  • Twitter adopted OpenID as the only way of authenticating.
  • Twitter showed the authenticated OpenID identifier instead of a (possibly made up) user handle on all tweets.
  • Kanye West would have used his official website URL as his OpenID.
  • Ergo, everybody could follow the OpenID to determine whether any phriend phishing is going on or not.

I admit that scenario is not entirely viable yet. For example, users are not familiar and comfortable enough yet with OpenID that a major-volume site like Twitter could switch to OpenID-only. But it’s close, and that’s the kind of adoption barriers that we need to work on over the next 12-18 months in the OpenID community.

I don’t know how OpenID can help solve this issue. Changing someone’s Twitter ID to his authenticated OpenID is not helping us forward. These are the reasons.

First, OpenID’s are assigned on a first-come first-served basis. I can pick any OpenID provider and register “http://BradPitt.<openidprovider>.com”. Even when some OpenID providers are going to validate your request, others won’t so users have no clue what to assume about an OpenID.

Second, even when you pick your homepage as your OpenID (using some mechanism of OpenID delegation), the user has no way to know which one of these is the right one:

http://www.bradpitt.com/
http://www.brad-pitt.com/
http://www.brad-pitt.org/
http://www.BradAndAngelina.com/

And last, what happens if someone is also named “Brad Pitt”? Is he not allowed to claim the OpenID “http://www.bradpitt.com/”?

I think OpenID has many added values, especially in the world of social media, but for the moment I don’t think owner assurance is one of them. With OpenID I can be fairly sure the Tweet came from someone owning that particular OpenID. But OpenID does not guarantee me that the names used in the OpenID URL itself are pointing to the owner.

Embarassing Facebook Moments

Paul Madsen confesses he was able to, just in time, avert an embarassing Facebook moment:

On what started as an innocuous thread on the relative merits of curling and football, comments were made by a non-work friend that, while completely appropriate to the relationship between myself and the commenter (we having a long history of questioning each other’s masculinity and mental health), were not appropriate for a work context (or 98% of any other contexts it must be said).

Paul also points to what he thinks is the root cause:

The fact that my Facebook friends list is an aggregation of both work and non-work hit home yesterday.

Facebook allows me to create lists but not, AFAICT, use those lists to compartmentalize through differentiated permissions, e.g. allow members of one list to participate in a thread and not another.

Since the first day I have been using Facebook I felt very uncomfortable with the way various friends list are managed. On Facebook, you always risk having embarassing “red face” moments when you have different types of friends list (work and friends for instance).

Facebook does have various settings related to privacy, who is allowed to see what, etcetera. But honestly, even I sometimes have it difficult to configure those in a way that I am confident no information is spilled from one group to another. Currently I even practically closed down my Facebook profile for everyone who is not a close friend. If you are not a close friend, you will only see some very basic information about me and that’s it (if you do see more and don’t consider yourself a closefriend, drop me line ;). But even with all careful configuration work, I know I will one day face a “Paul Madsen Moment” on Facebook.

Clearly, offering a bunch of configuration settings like Facebook does not solve the issue. First, it becomes (too) complicated very fast and second, even when configured properly, it still has open holes. Who has a good solution that works in complex environments like Facebook?

What about me !?

Paul Madsen got a Facebook invite from Ping’s Patrick Harding. It seems he was very proud of it until he discovered that, quoting Paul, “Patrick is making more friends then Britney backstage at a ‘Boyz II Men’ reunion tour.

I jumped over to Facebook to see if Patrick had already invited me and, if he did, rub it in Paul’s face that I was before him. Sadly, neither Paul nor Patrick are in my friends list. For now, there will be no joy in humiliating someone.

I send invites to both of them, let’s see what happens. I did meet Paul in person on two occasions: the Liberty meeting in Brussels and on the first European Identity Conference.